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I. INTRODUCTION
"Privatization" means increased governmental reliance on the
private sector, rather than on government agencies, to satisfy the
needs of society. Since the word was first used in 1969,' privatiza-
tion has gained broad recognition and widespread acceptance, and,
in recent years, a major trend toward privatization has developed
in the United States and abroad. The reasons for this trend are
both pragmatic and ideological. Pragmatists advocate privatization
because it offers a more efficient way to provide goods and services.
Ideological opponents of big government support privatization be-
cause it reduces the role of government. Privatization is therefore
an important movement in East and West, in developing and de-
veloped countries, in communist and capitalist nations. It has
taken root even in China and the Soviet Union.
Privatization in the United States has taken a different form
than it has in other countries. Outside the United States, in both
developing and developed countries, the principal form of priva-
tization is denationalization-the divestment of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs). In the United States, which has relatively few
SOEs, state and local governments are implementing privatization
* Adapted from E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY To BETTEr GOVERNMENT (1987).
** Professor and Chairman, Management Department, School of Business and Public
Administration, Baruch College, City University of New York.
1. The earliest use of the term appears to have been in P. DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DIs-
CONTINUITY (1969) (using the term "reprivatization").
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primarily through contracting and, to a lesser degree, vouchers,
franchises, free-market arrangements, and voluntary efforts. 2 Con-
tracting, however, is the primary method governments use to
privatize prisons.3
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PRIVATIZATION IN GENERAL
A. Extent of Contracting for Services
The results of a 1982 survey, summarized in Table 1, reveal
the extent to which local governments have contracted with pri-
vate sources for the provision of local government services. On av-
erage each jurisdiction surveyed contracted out, in whole or in
part, twenty-seven percent of the fifty-nine services examined in
the survey. Information concerning the contracting out of emer-
gency medical care, ambulance service, day-care facility operation,
programs for children and the elderly, operation and management
of hospitals and mental health facilities, and operation of drug and
alcohol treatment programs is especially relevant to a discussion of
prison contracting. One-quarter to one-half of the jurisdictions sur-
veyed contract with, and rely on, private profit or nonprofit organi-
zations to supply each of these vital services. These services, which
primarily are concerned with vulnerable or partially incapacitated
segments of the population, have exhibited the greatest growth
rate for privatization by contracting.4 Government reliance upon
private organizations in these areas is significant because prisoners
also can be described as a vulnerable and incapacitated segment of
the population. Other privatization arrangements relevant to a dis-
cussion of prison contracting involve the development of private
police protection, alternative dispute resolution, and legal aid.
2. E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT ch. 4 (1987).
3. Under this approach, government agencies contract with and pay private firms to
operate prisons or to provide some of the functional services in prisons.
4. By 1979 government agencies were purchasing 55% of the dollar value of social
services from private organizations. Knowledgeable authorities considered this to be the
fastest growing area. See H. HATRY & E. DURMAN, ISSUES IN COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING FOR
SOCIAL SERVICES (National Institute of Governmental Purchasing 1985).
[Vol. 40:889
19871 PRIVATIZATION AND PRISONS 891
Table 1.1
Number of Percentage Percentage
governments Contracting With: Contracting With:










patrol 1660 3 7
Police/fire
communication 1684 1 3
Fire prevention/
suppression 1516 1 4
Emergency
medical service 1333 14 11
Ambulance
service 1214 25 11
Traffic control/
parking
enforcement 1505 1 1
Vehicle towing
and storage 1285 80 0





inspection 939 1 6
Insect/rodent
control 1037 14 5
Animal control 1482 6 9
Animal shelter
operation 1225 13 19
Day-care facility
operation 436 35 43
Child welfare
programs 558 5 26
Programs for




housing 602 13 19
Operation/
management of
hospitals 361 30 28
5. Table 1 is based on a survey of 1780 county and local governments. See C. VALENTE
& L MANCHESTER, RETHINKING LOCAL SERVICES: EXAMINING ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY AP-
PROACHES, Table B (Management Information Service Special Report 1984).
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Public health
programs 721 8 29
Drug/alcohol
treatment





facilities 512 7 43








average 1511 18 2
Grand average 17 10
Individuals, businesses, neighborhood associations, or govern-
ments may purchase private police services." In fact, the number of
guards in the private security industry far exceeds the number of
public law-enforcement officers.7 In 1980 expenditures for private
security guards in the United States totalled 21.7 billion dollars, as
compared to the 13.8 billion dollars expended for public police
forces.8 Private police provide a large portion of guard services for
federal government facilities,9 conduct passenger and baggage
screening at airports, protect stores against shoplifters, and pro-
vide security in banks and hotels, often working in close coopera-
tion with local police departments. 10
Using private sources for the provision of certain judicial func-
tions is another example of the application of the privatization
concept. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), colloquially known
as "rent-a-judge," refers to arbitration services available from pri-
vate sources. Disputants engage such services because they usually
are speedier, more convenient, and more economical than tradi-
tional civil court proceedings. ADR is less expensive than civil
court proceedings because fewer hours of costly legal work are
6. Table 1 lists only government contracts with private guard services.
7. The private security industry employs 680,000 guards while public law enforcement
officers number only 580,000. See Cunningham & Taylor, The Hallcrest Report: Private
Security and Police in America, in CRIME AND PROTECTION IN AMERICA (D. Ford ed. 1985).
8. Id.
9. Peyton, Standards for Public Building Maintenance, 44 APWA Rep., Oct. 1977, at
28-29.
10. See Stewart, Public Safety and Private Policy, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 758-65 (1985).
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needed. It is more economical because the cost of litigation in civil
courts often exceeds the damages recovered."
A form of privatization similar to ADR is developing to help
resolve certain private disputes that result in misdemeanors.
Courts refer these cases to neighborhood justice centers and com-
munity dispute resolution committees. The disputes range from
squabbles about loose dogs and loud radios to assault and battery
and petty theft between neighbors. The mediators, who usually are
trained lay persons, hold prompt, informal, and confidential hear-
ings through which they attempt to determine the underlying
causes of the disputes.
12
Commentators have criticized these dispute resolution pro-
grams because they believe that the programs create a second-class
justice system for the poor."3 For example, should judges assign
cases of domestic violence to neighborhood justice centers for reso-
lution instead of criminal courts? Although privatized justice for
civil cases is both plausible and sensible, the use of privatized jus-
tice in criminal cases presents a more difficult question.
In addition to private police protection, ADR, and neighbor-
hood justice centers, various state and local governments have con-
tracted with the private sector to provide legal services for indigent
criminal defendants. Such privatized legal aid is an alternative to
the in-house government services of a public defender. The two
systems have not been subjected to thorough comparative analysis,
but privatized legal aid compares favorably with the services of
privately retained lawyers
1 4
B. Attitudes and Evidence on Privatization
Public officials who have contracted with private sources for
local governmental services generally have been satisfied with the
results of their privatization experiment. Table 2 summarizes the
results of a nationwide survey of municipal and county officials
11. The media and civil liberties groups have criticized ADR because the proceedings
are closed to the public. But does the public have a right to watch people fight? Must all
disagreements be exposed to public view by a prurient press? Why not complain that when
a court case is resolved before trial (the vast majority of all cases), the public also is de-
prived of its gladiator spectacles?
12. See Tolchin, When the Justice System is Put Under Contract, N.Y. Times, Aug.
4, 1985, § 6, at 4, col. 4. For example, the Neighborhood Justice Center in Atlanta handled
2400 cases in 1984, 56% of which were criminal. See id.
13. Id.
14. R. HERMAN, E. SINGLE & J. BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE PooR CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN
URBAN AMERICA (1977).
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who have contracted out local government services. The officials'
responses to the survey presumably reflect their experiences with
the various contract services listed in Table 1.
Table 2.'5
Small Jurisdictions Large Jurisdictions
Costs less 40 % 41 %
Costs same 19 22
Costs more 34 10
Better service 63 33
Same service 14 48
Worse service 22 15
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of a larger survey con-
ducted in New Jersey." The results of this survey indicate that the
public officials surveyed were highly satisfied with contract ser-
vices. Cost savings, in-house limitations, and better management
are the dominant reasons why public officials contract for services.
The in-house limitations that influence a public official's decision
to contract with private sources include the need for large capital
investments and the lack of facilities.17 These factors are particu-
larly important in a public official's decision to contract out prison
construction, operation, and management."8
Table 3.19
Very Somewhat No
Service Area satisfied satisfied Dissatisfied Opinion N
A. Municipal Officials
Public works 58 % 29 % 10 % 3 % 149
Public safety 72 22 6 0 18
Social services 74 26 0 0 23
Total 61 % 28 % 8 % 2 % 190
15. The small jurisdiction category covers municipalities with populations under
50,000; the sample size is 89. See Florestano & Gordon, Public vs. Private: Small Govern-
ment Contracting with the Private Sector, 40 PuB. ADMIN. REV., Jan./Feb. 1980, at 29-34.
The large jurisdiction category covers 14 municipalities and 14 counties with populations
greater than 500,000. See Florestano & Gordon, Private Provision of Public Services: Con-
tracting by Large Local Governments, 1 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 307, 307-27 (1979).
16. The stratified random samples employed iri this study are representative of all the
municipalities and counties in the state.
17. See infra note 20 and accompanying Table 4.
18. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
19. "N" is the number of officials responding. Table 3 is derived from EAGLETON INSTI-
TUTE OF POLITICS, ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES IN NEW JERSEY
26-29 (1986) (prepared for the State and Local Expenditure and Revenue Policy
Commission).
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B. County Officials 68 % 25 % 7 % 0 % 57
Table 4.2
Cost In-house Better
Service Area savings limitations management Other N
A. Municipal Officials
Public works 43 % 31 % 4 % 22 % 134
Pubic safety 53 21 5 21 19
Social services 20 36 20 24 25
Total 41 % 30 % 6 % 23 % 178
B. County Officials 36 'e 30 % 7 % 27 % 56
The evidence provided by numerous studies comparing the ef-
ficiency, effectiveness, equity, and quality of contract and in-house
services indicates that the positive attitude exhibited by public of-
ficials toward contracting is justified.21 The results of these studies
suggest that direct provision of a service by a government agency
generally costs one-third to one-half more than the price charged
by a private contractor to do work of equal quality.
22
III. PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS
23
When first proposed, privatization of the prison industry
seemed a dramatic and thought-provoking concept. In retrospect,
however, it was a natural and inevitable development. While the
demand for criminal incarceration is growing, the supply of prison
space is not keeping pace.24 Prison overcrowding demonstrates the
need for new facilities, but the cost of prison construction and op-
eration is high. Although the public demands that criminals be in-
carcerated, the public refuses to pay the price for such services.
Privatization of prisons, therefore, represents an influx of new sup-
pliers who are attempting to satisfy these needs, and earn profits
in the process. 25
20. "N" is the number of officials responding. "In-house limitations" refers to high
start-up costs, large capital investment, or lack of physical facilities, manpower, or expertise.
"Other" includes convenience, legal mandates, and better service delivery. Id.
21. Generally speaking, the most authoritative studies involved quantifiable "hard ser-
vices" (e.g., public works, commercial, and transportation services) rather than less quantifi-
able "soft" services (e.g., human and social services). See E. SAVAS, supra note 2, at chs. 6 &
7.
22. Id.
23. Id. at ch. 7.
24. See Logan & Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private Enterprise
Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303, 303-18 (1985). Logan and Rausch estimate that by 1983 state and
federal prisons were at 110% of their capacity.
25. See Mullen, Corrections and the Private Sector, 65 PRISON J., Autumn-Winter
1987]
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The private sector can perform several distinct functions with
respect to prisons: (1) finance and construct prisons; (2) operate
facilities for juveniles; (3) operate facilities for adults; (4) provide
work for prisoners; and (5) provide specific contractual services to
prisons, for example, health care and vocational education for the
inmates and training for the staff. Public interest focuses on the
role of private firms in the first three of these areas, the construc-
tion and operation of various types of correctional facilities. Pri-
vate organizations, particularly not-for-profit ones, have operated
halfway houses for criminal offenders for many years. Now, how-
ever, they also operate detention facilities.26 Private, for-profit
firms are planning maximum-security prisons. In 1985 private
firms were building or operating some two dozen adult prisons,
most of them for illegal aliens and protective-custody prisoners. 28
Interest in prison privatization stems from the perception that
private prisons are more cost effective and efficient, constructed
more quickly, and operated under more flexible and innovative
management. Although public costs are said to be twenty to forty
percent greater than private costs, the evidence is not yet persua-
sive because public costs omit various factors and private costs
may or may not cover the construction costs of new facilities. 29 A
definitive study of the relative costs of private and public prison
service provision cannot be completed until more private prisons
are operating and uniform cost frameworks are established.
The private-sector advantage in speed and flexibility of con-
struction has merit. State governments find private financing and
construction attractive, in part because it permits them to evade
voter approval of bond issues. Typically, the state does not have to
raise the capital to build the prison. The private sector builds the
prison with private financing and operates it. The state then makes
annual payments to the private owner under a lease-purchase con-
tract."0 Although the validity of this arrangement has been ques-
tioned because it bypasses express voter approval, it saves time
and money for state governments.
1985, at 1.
26. Logan & Rausch, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Telephone Interview with Charles H. Logan, Professor, University of Connecticut
(Jan. 14, 1986).
29. Logan & Rausch, supra note 24, at 310.
30. See id. at 313-16 (presenting several illustrations of the speed and flexibility with
which private firms respond to government requests for additional prison space).
896 [Vol. 40:889
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Private companies already provide extensive contract services
in existing prisons. Sixty-six correctional agencies in thirty-nine
states plus the District of Columbia spent about 200 million dollars
in 1983 on 3215 contracts with private firms for thirty-two differ-
ent services and programs." These services consisted mostly of
health and mental-health care, drug treatment, counseling, educa-
tion, vocational training, college programs, and staff training. The
agencies reported that contract services were more cost effective
than those that the agency could provide, that advantages out-
weighed disadvantages, and that most of the agencies planned to
expand their use of contracts for specific services.32
IV. RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRISON PRIVATIZATION
Despite the widespread and long-standing use of contractors
to provide some prison services, civil libertarians and correction of-
ficers and officials have expressed concern about the possibility
that private, for-profit firms would own or operate prisons. The is-
sues raised by these concerned individuals include basic constitu-
tional questions concerning a private individual's right to deprive
others of their freedom. Advocates of privatization respond that
although only the state has the right to imprison one of its citizens,
it surely is not the only entity that can run a prison in a fair, hu-
mane, and efficient manner.
Present prison conditions make it difficult, if not impossible,
to argue that governments, rather than private firms, should oper-
ate prisons because the latter would tolerate poor conditions in
their pursuit of profits. In 1986 thirty-three states and numerous
localities were under federal court orders to correct the miserable,
overcrowded conditions in their prisons.3 3 In 1984 the 382,000 in-
mates in the Nation's 694 state prisons occupied an average of 57
square feet of housing space-li percent less than in 19 79.a4 Fur-
31. Camp & Camp, Correctional Privatization in Perspective, 65 PRISON J., Autumn-
Winter 1985, at 14.
32. Id. at 19-21.
33. See Inside America's Toughtest Prisons, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1986, at 46. Indeed, a
court may be better able to enforce its orders on a private firm than on an agency in another
branch of government. See Applebome, Texas Held in Contempt of Court Over Prisons,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1987, at 14, col 1. Moreover, one-third of the nation's 3500 city and
county jails recently have been involved in class action lawsuits brought by inmates who
allege that inadequate medical care caused serious injuries and death. See Steptoe, Inmates
Claim Prisons Are Failing to Provide Adequate Medical Care, Wall St. J., May 15, 1986, at
1, col 1.
34. Study Finds Prison Space Cut, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1986, at 29, col 1.
1987] 897
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thermore, the record of for-profit hospitals demonstrates that a
private organization's quest for profits does not lead necessarily to
poor services: the quality of medical care provided by for-profit
hospitals is equal to that provided by nonprofit hospitals.3 5
Contracts for private prisons must specify standards for in-
mate care and staff training, guarantees of constitutional treat-
ment, and guidelines for discipline and the use of force. These
standards, guarantees, and guidelines, however, are also necessary
in public prisons. If government prison contracts carefully and
clearly allocate authority and liability between public and private
agents, problems can be minimized.
In addition to the above concerns, some opponents of prison
privatization argue that it is immoral to profit from the imprison-
ment of others. Privatizing prisons, however, is no more immoral
than paying police officers to capture criminals or physicians to
save lives. The justice system itself is already a source of profit for
numerous professions. The fact that an activity is vital to human
welfare is no reason to isolate it from competition and profit. If
this were true, government agencies would be the exclusive provid-
ers of food, clothing, medical care, transportation, and housing.
3 6
Some opponents of privatization further claim that private
prison firms will be inclined to lobby for more and longer prison
sentences and less use of probation, parole, and halfway houses. If
this argument was sound, however, prison officials, guards, and
their unions presumably would act in the same manner for the
same reasons. This, however, is not the case. Even if private
prison firms did lobby for these policies such lobbying may demon-
strate responsiveness to the public's demand for longer sentences.
Moreover, although such lobbying may result in increased spend-
ing on private prison projects, it could also result in the improve-
ment of prison conditions.
Private prisons may be able to make a truly significant contri-
bution in the area of prisoner work programs by creating factories
with fences instead of warehouses with walls, in the words of for-
mer Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Of course, governments must
not create a modern replica of the old system under which states
leased prisoners to farms where prisoners worked for substandard
35. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE (1986).
36. D. BAST, IN DEFENSE OF PRIVATE PRISONS (Heartland Institute ed. Mar. 4, 1986).
37. Moreover, one can look by analogy at day-care centers: Private contractors in that





Proponents of prison privatization must oveicome legislative
and political barriers, as well as union opposition, to private pris-
ons and prison work. The need to define clearly the respective
roles of the public agency and the contractor, to develop quality
standards, and to monitor the performance of the contracted work
is critical to the privatization effort. Governments can monitor pri-
vate prison operations through a gamut of activities, including ex-
amining the contractor's records, conducting on-site inspections,
and using temporarily imprisoned undercover agents and sophisti-
cated inmate opinion surveys.38
V. CONCLUSION
The unsatisfactory state of America's penal system and the
high recidivism rate warrant experimenting with alternative ap-
proaches to inmate care and encouraging a much more substantive
role for the private sector. Prison privatization will no doubt raise
problems. Many issues, including those identified above, will have
to be addressed. Nevertheless, the expected innovations from a pri-
vate prison industry and the introduction of competition as an an-
tidote to government monopoly hold the promise of great improve-
ment in our prison system and the challenge of learning from new
experiences.
38. Recidivists who have been imprisoned elsewhere might be particularly in demand
as interview subjects because they offer the perspective of a comparison shopper! See, e.g.,
Press, "A Person, Not a Number," NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1987, at 63.
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